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INTRODUCTION
Drunk driving is a problem that imposes tremendous costs on
society.' Alcohol-related fatalities numbered 16,589 in 1994,2 and
thousands more were injured in drunk driving accidents.3 The yearly
estimated costs of driving under the influence (DUI) accidents total
$46 billion.4 Within the past decade, nationwide advertising cam-
paigns by citizen activist groups5 have made the public more aware,
and increasingly less tolerant, of the destruction created by drunk
drivers.' Public lobbying efforts, along with federal monetary
incentives,7 have led state legislatures to enact new drunk driving laws
1. See generally 141 CONG. REC. S15,501 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (noting dangers of drunk driving and urging Senate to support Drunk Driving
Prevention Act of 1995); Kirsten K. Davis, Note, Ohio's New Administrative License Suspension for
Drunk Driving. Essential Statute Has Unconstitutional Effect, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 697, 697-98 (1994)
(noting that in 1990, drunk driving accidents resulted in over 22,000 deaths, 355,000 injuries,
and $57 billion in total costs).
2. Drunk Driving & Liquor Liability, INS. ISSUES UPDATE (Ins. Info. Inst., New York, N.Y.)
(Ruth Gastel ed.), Oct. 1995, at 1; see also C. Fraser Smith, Repeat Drunken Drivers Are a National
Menace, BALT. SUN, Jan. 1, 1995, at A18 (stating that more than 17,400 people were killed in
crashes involving drunk drivers in both 1993 and 1994). Drunk driving accidents remain the
leading cause of death for people between the ages of 6 and 33, causing even more fatalities
than handguns. Smith, supra, at A18.
3. Drunk Driving & Liquor Liability, supra note 2, at 1. Injuries in alcohol-related crashes
numbered 297,000, the equivalent of one injury every two minutes. Id. Alcohol was a factor in
41% of traffic accidents occurring in 1994. Id.
4. Drinking, Driving and Staying Aliv CH. TRIB., Dec. 31, 1994, at 22 (editorial)
[hereinafter Staying Alive].
5. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) has led the fight against drinking and driving
and has been joined in its publicity efforts by groups such as Students Against Drunk Driving
(SADD) and Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), as well as by the insurance industry. Drunk
Driving & Liquor Liability, supra note 2, at 7. These citizen activist groups have been particularly
successful in reaching under-21 drivers, who participate in campaigns at their high schools. Ild.
at 4. This age group has experienced the greatest decline in arrests for drunk driving. I.
Future campaigns will target new groups most likely to be involved in drunk driving
accidents-adults age 21 to 34 and alcoholics. Id.
6. See Drunk Driving & Liquor Liability, supra note 2, at 1, 7 (stating that public awareness
has "increased dramatically over the past dozen years" and polls indicate that most Americans
support stricter penalties for DUI offenders); Ellen Perlman, Authorities Get Even Tougher on
Drunken Drivers: States Lowering Limits for Intoxication, Boosting Penalties for Those Caught, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWs, Sept. 25, 1994, at A12 (noting public support behind state efforts to lower
standards for legal intoxication and to set harsher penalties for violators). In a 1994 Gallup Poll
surveying 2000 people, over half felt that penalties for first-time offenders were too lenient, and
two-thirds replied that penalties for repeat offenders were not severe enough. Perlman, supra,'
at A12.
7. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1994) (providing that states failing to raise their legal drinking age
to 21 by October 1, 1986, faced 5% cut in federal highway aid for 1987 and 10% cut in aid for
1988); see also Drunk Driving Prevention Act of 1988, 23 U.S.C. § 410(d)(1) (1994). In 1988,
Congress passed legislation providing increased highway funds for states if they enacted
administrative license suspension laws. Id. By 1991, in order to receive increased funds, states
were required to pass five of six laws identified by experts as being most effective in curbing
drunk driving accidents. Id. § 410(d). In addition to license suspension laws, state legislatures
could choose to use sobriety checkpoints, reduce the legal blood alcohol limit, implement
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that impose strict penalties on DUI offenders.' One of the mecha-
nisms most widely used to combat drunk driving and increase highway
safety is administrative license suspension (ALS).'
education programs for convicted DUI offenders, create self-sustaining drunk driving prevention
programs under which a portion of fines collected from offenders are returned to the
community, or create schemes making it more difficult for persons under 21 to obtain alcohol.
Id. § 410(d)(1)-(6).
8. See Staying Alive, supra note 4, at 22 (stating that "stern" measures taken by legislatures,
such as license suspensions, stiffer sentences, and police roadblocks, have helped discourage
drunk driving). Several states have reduced the minimum DUI blood alcohol content from
.10% to .08%, making it easier to be found guilty of this offense. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5A-
191 (1989 & Supp. 1995); CAL VEH. CODE § 23,152 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-1567 (1991 & Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:82 (1993 & Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-138 (1993 & Supp. 1995); OP. REV. STAT. § 813.010 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-
44 (1993 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1201 (1987 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-266 (1988 & Supp. 1995). In addition, various states have recently enacted laws to combat
drunk driving, such as vehicle impoundment and installation of steering-wheel locking devices
for repeat offenders. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-697.01 (Supp. 1995) (stating that court
shall order convicted offender's vehicle to be forfeited in addition to any other penalty
imposed); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-111 (1994) (providing that court can order offender's vehicle
equipped with ignition interlock device as condition of probation); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 27-107 (1992) (allowing court to prohibit DUI offenders from operating vehicle for up to
three years unless vehicle is equipped with ignition interlock system that prevents vehicle from
starting if driver's blood alcohol level exceeds calibrated setting). As ofJanuary 1, 1995, Illinois
has a "zero tolerance" policy for people under age 21, meaning that a person under age 21 will
have his or her license suspended if he or she is found to have a mere .02% blood alcohol level.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, par. 5/11-501.8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995). Maine enacted a similar
law in May 1995. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A § 2472 (3) (B) (4) (West Supp. 1995).
9. Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have laws which provide for the
immediate suspension of a license when a driver fails a breath test. ALASKA STAT.
§ 28.15.165(a) (1) (1994 & Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-694 (1989 & Supp. 1995);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-104(4) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); CAL VEH. CODE § 23,137 (West
Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-122(2) (a) (I) (1993 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-227b(c) (1987 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 21, §§ 2741-2743 (1985 & Supp.
1995); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit 18, §§ 302.5, 306.1, 306.4 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615
(Harrison 1986 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 40.5-67.1(b) (Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 286-257 to -258 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 625, para. 5/6-206(31) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-6-9(b) (Burns 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321J.12 (West Supp.
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1014(a) (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:667(A)(1) (West 1989 &
Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29A, § 2411(5) (A) (2) (West Supp. 1995); MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(a) (2) (i) (1992 & Supp. 1995); MASS. ANN. LAwS. ch. 90, § 24(1) (f) (2)
(Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 1996); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(7) (Callaghan Supp. 1995); MINN.
STAT. § 169.123(4) (1986 & Supp. 1996); MIss. CODEANN. § 63-11-23(2) (1989); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 302.309.3 (Supp. 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6, 206 (1993); NEv. REV. STAT. § 484.385 (1993);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:91-a (1993 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-111.1 (Michie
1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-20-04,39-20-03.1 (1980 & Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
47, § 6-205.1 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 813.100(3) (1993); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 521.341 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 5-3-222 to -223 (1993 & Supp. 1995); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205 (1987 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-391.2 (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 17-
C-5A-1 to -3 (1991 & Supp. 1995); WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(9) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995);
WYo. STAT. § 31-6-102(e) (1994); see also Tommy Sangchompuphen, Drunk Divers Claim They Are
Punished Twice, WALL. ST. J., June 21, 1995, at BI, B4 (stating that 38 states and District of
Columbia utilize administrative license suspension for drivers who fail chemical test). In
addition, at least 43 states and the District of Columbia suspend the licenses of drivers who
refuse to take a breath test. ALA. CODE § 32-5-192 (1989 & Supp. 1995); ALASKA STAT.
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§ 28.15.165(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1995); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (1989 & Supp. 1995);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-205 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (West 1987
& Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-122(2) (1993 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-227b (1987 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2742-2743 (1985 & Supp.
1995); D.C. CODE § 40-505(a) (1990 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.2615 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 40.5-67.1(b) (Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-155.5 (Supp.
1992); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 625, para. 5/6-206(31) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 9-30-6-9(a) (Bums 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321J.9 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
1014(a) (1991); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:667(B) (2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29A, § 2501(3) (West 1995); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(a)(2) (ii) (2) (1992 &
Supp. 1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 1996); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(1)(6)(b)(iv) (Callaghan 1991 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. § 169.121(4)
(1986 & Supp. 1995); MISS. CODEANN. §§ 63-11-5 & 63-11-23(1) (1989); MONT. CODEANN. § 61-
8-402 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:91-a (1993 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-111
(Michie 1978); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 39-20-04 (1980 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Anderson 1993 & Supp.
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-205.1 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 813.100(3)
(1993); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(b) (1) (1977); ILI. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (1994 & Supp.
1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950(d) (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 32-23-11 (1989 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406 (1993 & Supp. 1995); TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.251 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (1993 & Supp.
1995); VT. SrAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205 (1987 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-391.2 (Michie
1994 & Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); W. VA.
CODE § 17-C-5-4 (1991 & Supp. 1995); WISc. STAT. ANN. § 343.10 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995);
Wyo. STAT. § 31-6-102(a) (ii) (A) (1994); see also Sangchompuphen, supra, at B4 (stating that all
50 states suspend licenses for drivers who fail breath test).
In comparison, at least 24 states have ignition interlock laws. ALASKA SrAT. § 12.55.102(a)
(Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-118 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-26-126.1 (Supp. 1995); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 21, §§ 4177F (Supp. 1995); GA. CODEANN. § 42-
8-112 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-264(d) (Supp. 1992); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-30-5-16 (Michie
1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321J.4(7) (West Supp. 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:378.2 (West
Supp. 1996); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(2) (8) (Callaghan Supp. 1995); Act ofJul. 6,1995, West
No. 122, 1995 MO. LEGIs. SERV. (Vernon); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179.3 (1993); N.Y. VEH. &TRAF.
LAW § 1198 (McKinney Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(I) (1993 & Supp. 1995);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991a (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 813.602 (1993); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-27-2(d) (2) (1994 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-412(d) (1993 & Supp.
1995); TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.246 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.7
(Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270.1 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.20.710 (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-3a(c) (Supp. 1995); WIsC. STAT, ANN.
§ 343.10 (West Supp. 1995); see Drunk Driving and LiquorLiabiliy, supra note 2, at 3-4 (asserting
that 24 states have these laws).
At least 22 jurisdictions have laws which allow forfeiture or impoundment of the vehicle or
license plate. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.036 (1994 & Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-
697.01(a) (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-117(a) (Michie 1993); CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23195(West 1987 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2756(c) (1985 & Supp. 1995);
D.C. CODE § 40-716(c-1) (Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193(6)(c) (West 1986 & Supp.
1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391.2 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 625, par. 5/4-203(e) (Smith-
Hurd 1993); IOWA CODEANN. § 321J (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29A, § 2421(1)
(West 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28.2 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (1980 & Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.164 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 809.700 (1993); RI.L GEN.
LAWs § 31-27-2(d) (3) (ii) (1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-6240(A) (Law. Co-op.
1991 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODEANN. § 55-10-403(k) (1993 & Supp. 1995); TEx. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 704.001 (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.5058 (Supp. 1996); WISc.
STAT. ANN. § 343.305(10m) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); Commonwealth v. Crosby, 568 A.2d 233,
239 (Pa. Super. 1990)); see also Drunk Driving and Liquor Liability, supra note 2, at 3-4 (providing
that 28 states have forfeiture or impoundment laws).
Laws prohibiting open containers of alcohol in the passenger compartments of vehicles exist
in at least 25 states. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.029 (Supp. 1995); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23223 (West
1987 & Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE § 25-128 (1991 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1963
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Current state statutory schemes nationwide provide that when a
police officer stops a driver on suspicion for drunk driving and the
driver either fails to pass or refuses to take the requisite chemical test
determining the driver's blood alcohol content, the officer will seize
the driver's license, immediately suspending driving privileges.10 The
suspension is temporary," and drivers may apply for a restricted
license for employment purposes.1 2 The driver also may request an
(West 1986 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-253 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-3.2(a)
(Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE§§ 23-505 &-1333 (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 625, para. 5/11-502(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-15-3 (Bums Supp. 1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B,
§ 19-301 (1994); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2324(1) (Callaghan Supp. 1995); MNN. STAT.
§§ 169.122(2), (3) (1986 & Supp. 1996); NEv. REv. STAT. § 484.448(2) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 265:81(II)-(III) (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-401(a) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-
18 (1980 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.62(b) (4), (5) (Anderson 1993 & Supp.
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1220 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 811.170 (1993); S.C.
CODEANN. §§ 61-5-20,61-9-87 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-
1-9.1 (1992); TENN. CODEANN. § 55-10-416 (Supp. 1995); UTAH CODEANN. § 41-6-44.20 (1993);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.61.519(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); Wisc. STAT. ANN.
§§ 346.935(2), (3) (West 1991); see also Drunk Driving and Liquor Liability, supra note 2, at 3-4
(stating that 28 states have open container laws). Finally, at least 27 states and the District of
Columbia have lowered the legal limit of blood alcohol content for youthful offenders. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-244(34) (1989 & Supp. 1995); ARK. CODEANN. § 5-65-303(b) (Michie 1993);
CAL VEH. CODE § 23136(c) (West Supp. 1996); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 41771(a) (Supp. 1995);
D.C. CODE § 40-716(b) (1) (Supp. 1995); GA. CODEANN. § 40-6-391(k) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-
8004 (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 625, para. 5/6-206(c)-(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321J.2 (West Supp. 1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:98(A) (1) (b) (West 1986
& Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29A, § 22472 (3) (B) (West 1995); MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 16-113(b) (1993 & Supp. 1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(1) (f) (2) (iv) (Law. Co-op.
1994 & Supp. 1996); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325 (Callaghan 1991 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT.
§ 171.173 (Supp. 1996); Miss. CODEANN. § 63-11-30(1) (c) (Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-
110 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.3 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(b)
(Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 813.300 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.5
(1994 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-415(a) (1) (A) (1993); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 521.298 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-644.4 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 1216(a) (Supp. 1994); VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-266.1(A) (Michie Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 17-
C-5-4 (1991 & Supp. 1995); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 343.63(2m) (West 1991); see also Drunk Driving
and Liquor Liability, supra note 2, at 34 (asserting that 34 states have taken such measures).
10. See, ag., ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.165 (1994 & Supp. 1995); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23157 (West
Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2741-2743 (1985 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 322.2615 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 286-257 to -258 (Supp. 1992); MI.
TRANSP. CODEANN. § 16-205.1 (1993 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (1986 & Supp.
1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:91-a (1993 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191
(1993 & Supp. 1994); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b-1 (Supp. 1995) (amended 1995); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-391.2 (Mitchie 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205 (1987 & Supp. 1994).
11. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23157(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that license will be
revoked for one year if driver refuses chemical test); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(b)
(1993 & Supp. 1995) (setting authorized length of suspension at 45 days for first offenders
whose blood alcohol concentration (BAC) when tested exceeded legal limit; 90 days for
subsequent offenders who fail test; 120 days for first offenders who refuse to take test; and one
year for subsequent offenders who refuse to take test); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arL 6687b-1,
§ 6 (West Supp. 1995) (amended 1995) (authorizing 60-day suspension for first offenders and
120-day suspensions for second offenders).
12. Sem eg., CAL VEH. CODE § 13,352.5(f) (West Supp. 1996) (providing for restricted
license limited to travel in course of person's employment); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-
205.1(n) (1993 & Supp. 1995) (providing that administrative body may modify suspension or
issue restrictive license if licensee is required to drive vehicle in course of employment or if
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administrative hearing to determine whether the officer had probable
cause to detain the driver and conduct the chemical test." At the
same time that the license is suspended, the driver is arrested
pursuant to a separate statute and charged criminally with DUI, or as
some states title this offense, driving while intoxicated (DWI). 4
While there is evidence that these stricter drunk driving laws have
been effective in reducing the number of alcohol-related traffic
accidents, 5 the future of ALS provisions is uncertain. 6 Defendants
licensee has no alternative means of transportation and ability to earn living would be
substantially impaired by suspension); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-746(D) (1) (Law. Co-op. 1991 &
Supp. 1995) (permitting special restricted driver's license for individual who is employed or
enrolled in college or university at any time while license is suspended).
13. For an example of state statutes that allow such a hearing, see MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 16-205.1 (1993 & Supp. 1995). The Maryland statute states:
If the person requests a hearing at the time of or within 10 days after the issuance
of the order of suspension and surrenders the driver's license ... the Administration
shall set a hearing for a date within 30 days of the receipt of the request ...
After a hearing, the Administration shall suspend the driver's license... if:
1. The police officerwho stopped or detained the person had reasonable grounds
to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while
under the influence of alcohol ....
Id. §§ 16-205.1(f) (5) (i), (8)(i); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-691F (1989 & Supp. 1995)
(allowing drivers whose licenses have been suspended 15 days to request hearing which must,
in turn, be held within 30 days of request); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:91-b (1993 & Supp.
1994) (setting 30-day time limit for defendants to request administrative hearing and 20-day
subsequent time limit for administration to schedule that hearing); Lawrence Taylor, Drunk
Driving License Suspensions, TRIAL,June 1995, at 80, 80 (explaining that in typical case driver can
appeal suspension by requesting administrative hearing within 30 days).
14. See, e.g., State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 758 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
administrative revocation of defendants' licenses in consolidated case did not bar later
prosecution for drivingwhile intoxicated, refusing breath test, or both); Davidson v. MacKinnon,
656 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that administrative license suspension is
primarily for public safety, and thus does not violate DoubleJeopardy Clause); State v. Cassady,
662 A.2d 955,958-59 (N.H. 1995) (holding that administrative license suspension is not criminal
punishment and that subsequent prosecution for driving under influence is not barred by
DoubleJeopardy Clause); see also infranote 18 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which
DUI defendants subjected to both administrative license suspension and criminal prosecution
have challenged imposition of these sanctions under 5th Amendment DoubleJeopardy Clause).
15. See Daniel T. Gilbert &John A. Stephen, Is Suspension of Drivers'Licenses in Jeopardy?, 29
PROSECUTOR, May/June 1995, at 24, 26 ("'[A]dministrative license revocation laws have been
associated with a 5-9 percent decline in alcohol related crashes in states that enact these laws
compared to those that do not.'" (quoting testimony of Dr. Ralph Hingson, Boston University
School of Public Health, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Town Meeting on
Alcohol Abuse and Highway Safety (Feb. 16, 1995))). One newspaper reporter discussed the
effect that an absence of stricter drunk driving laws has had on the number of alcohol-related
traffic accidents, stating-
[T]he percentage of fatal crashes involving drivers with a blood-alcohol content of 0.10
percent or higher has not fallen as fast in Virginia as in states that have implemented
tougher license-revocation laws .... In 1982, about 27 percent of fatal crashes in both
Virginia and Maryland involved such drivers. By last year, Virginia's percentage had
fallen to 21.5, while Maryland's had dropped to 10.3.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Many Va. Drivers Convicted of DW! Keep Licenses; Repeat Offenders Often Evade
State's Revocation Procedures WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1994, at BI, B4. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration performed a study of the effects of administrative license suspension
(ALS) and found that among 17 states implementing the law, there was a median six percent
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have begun challenging the constitutionality of administrative license
suspension provisions, claiming that these provisions, when imposed
along with criminal sanctions for drunk driving, violate the Fifth
Amendment's protection against double jeopardy.17  This trend
began with the United States Supreme Court's decision last fall in
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,"8 a Montana drug case. In
Kurth Ranch, the Court ruled that prosecuting an individual for selling
marijuana and then imposing a civil marijuana tax on his property
constituted double jeopardy because it subjected the defendant to
multiple punishments for the same offense.19 Defense attorneys
have applied the Supreme Court's ruling to DUI cases, using it,
somewhat successfully, to convince lower state courts to dismiss
criminal charges or reverse convictions on double jeopardy
grounds."0 Lower court judges in at least twenty-one states with
administrative license suspension laws have accepted the double
jeopardy argument, thereby dismissing hundreds of criminal drunk
decrease in crashes likely to be alcohol-related. Drunk Driving & Liquor Liability, supra note 2,
at 8. The study found similar results regardless of whether ALS was the only mechanism in
effect to combat drunk driving or whether it was part of a larger scheme. Id.
16. SeeRichard C. Reuben, DoubleJeopardy Claims Gaining, A.B.A.J.,June 1995, at 16 (noting
vast split among courts as to whether civil sanctions such as license suspension are constitution-
al).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.. . ."). For examples of cases in which defendants have raised
constitutional challenges under the DoubleJeopardy Clause, see State v. Hickham, No. MV 94-
618025, 1995 WL 243352, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 1995), rev'd, 235 Conn. 614 (1995);
State v. Schwander, Nos. IN 94-08-1350 to 1354, 1995 WL 413248, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.June 15,
1995); Davidson v. Macfinnon, 656 So. 2d 223,223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Higa, 897
P.2d 928, 930 (Haw. 1995); Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790,
791 (La. 1992); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Me. 1995);Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199,
201 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 599-600 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995);
State v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA. 232,
1995 WL 387619, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.June 27, 1995); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510,511-12 (Vt.
1992). At the time of this writing, State v. Hickham was reversed by the Connecticut Supreme
Court. See State v. Hickham, 235 Conn. 614, 628 (1995) (concluding that defendant's license
suspension had legitimate remedial purpose and does not bar her criminal prosecution on
double jeopardy grounds).
18. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
19. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
20. See, e.g., State v. Hickham, No. MV 94-618025, 1995 WL 243352, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 20, 1995) (granting motion to dismiss charges where court determined that 90-day license
suspension was "penalty and deterrent of great magnitude" and, therefore, violated Double
Jeopardy Clause), reu'd, 235 Conn. 614 (1995); State v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA 232, 1995 WL
387619, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27, 1995) (affirming trial court determination that 90-day
license suspension was punishment for purposes of double jeopardy); State v. Ackrouche, 650
N.E.2d 535, 539 (Ohio Mun. 1995) (holding that AIS constitutes punishment imposed in
separate proceeding for same conduct that is subject of criminal prosecution and therefore
DoubleJeopardy Clause bars criminal prosecution on that charge). But seeUnited States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (holding that Congress may impose both
criminal and civil sanctions with respect to same act or omission).
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driving charges.2 At least one state has even instructed police to
stop confiscating drivers' licenses because of the high number of
dismissals.22
This Comment demonstrates that administrative license suspensions
imposed along with criminal sanctions do not constitute double
jeopardy because they are remedial, not punitive, in both purpose and
effect. A remedial sanction, as opposed to a punitive sanction, is one
that serves a purpose other than punishment or deterrence-either
compensating the government for monetary loss or protecting society
from some danger or wrong.3 Remedial civil sanctions are not
characterized as punishment and can be imposed in addition to
criminal penalties without invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause's
protection against multiple punishments.24
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of double jeopardy
protection, detailing a recent trilogy of cases in which the Supreme
Court expanded double jeopardy protection to apply to parallel civil
and criminal proceedings. Part II analyzes the double jeopardy issue
in administrative license suspension cases in light of the standards set
by the Supreme Court in this trilogy. This Part particularly discusses
the requirement that a second sanction must be considered punitive
in character in order to invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause, and
argues that license suspensions fail to fit this characterization. Finally,
Part IlI recommends that lower court judges refuse to accept the
double jeopardy argument in administrative license suspension cases
and continue to allow the use of license suspensions, in addition to
criminal prosecutions, as a valuable remedial mechanism in protecting
the public from the dangers posed by drunk drivers. This Part also
recommends that the Supreme Court address the issue of double
jeopardy and administrative license suspension in order to dispel
21. Leef Smith, Va. Judges of Two Minds When Ruling on Driver's License Seizure Law, WASH.
PosT, July 13, 1995, at B5.
22. See IDAHO CODE § 18-8002B (Supp. 1995) (stating that until July 1, 1997 no police
officer should enforce ALS law); see also Taylor, supra note 13, at 80 (stating that recent flurry
of trial court decisions have caused Idaho to end practice of confiscating licenses). The
Connecticut legislature modified its DUI laws to avoid losing cases while appeals are pending.
SeeSangchompuphen, supra note 9, at BI, B4 (stating that Connecticut voted to suspend licenses
of first-time offenders and to seek criminal prosecution only for repeat offenders or those who
physically injure or kill other people); see also Telephone Interview with Susan Naide, Assistant
State's Attorney, Connecticut Chief State's Attorney's Office (Apr. 9, 1996) (informing that
Connecticut legislature, while State v. Hickham was pending on appeal, made license suspension
discretionary, saving hundreds of criminal cases from being dismissed on double jeopardy
grounds).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 56-69, 150-69 (detailing how various courts have
defined "remedial" for double jeopardy purposes).
24. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing Supreme Court's stance on whether parallel civil and
criminal sanctions constitute double jeopardy violation).
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some of the confusion resulting from its recent decisions in other
areas concerning double jeopardy in civil and criminal proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Double Jeopardy Guarantee
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States provides that no person "shall...
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb ... "25 This protection is not limited to capital felonies; it also
applies to offenses for which lesser sanctions, such as imprisonment
and monetary penalties, can be imposed.26 The guarantee against
double jeopardy consists of three separate constitutional
protections." It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. 8
In Benton v. Maryland,29 the Court applied the protection against
double jeopardy to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
holding that the guarantee "represents a fundamental ideal in our
constitutional heritage.""°
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
26. See William S. McAnich, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411,414-16
(1993) (stating that language chosen by Framers of Fifth Amendment provided broader scope
of double jeopardy protection applying to all crimes than did English common law protection
which covered only capital felonies).
27. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). In Pear, one of the defendants
was sentenced to 10 years in prison, but after two and one half years his sentence was set aside
because he had not been granted his right to counsel. Id. at 714. He was retried and sentenced
to 25 years, but no credit was given for time already served. Id. The Court then held that the
constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense requires that
punishment already exacted must be credited in a new conviction for the same offense. Id. at
719.
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
30. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,794 (1969). The guarantee against double jeopardy
originated in early Roman and canon law and can be traced from ancient times to seventeenth
century English common law to colonial American jurisprudence. David S. Rudstein, Civil
Penalties and Multiple Punishment Under the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46
OKLA. L. REv. 587, 588 n.4 (1993). Professor Rudstein explains:
Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct
is one of the oldest ideas in western civilization. Its roots run deep into Greek and
Roman times. Even in the Dark Ages, when so many other principles ofjustice were
lost, the idea that one trial and one punishment were enough remained alive through
the canon law and the teachings of the early Christian writers. By the thirteenth
century it seems to have been firmly established in England, where it came to be
considered as a "universal maxim of the common law." It is not surprising, therefore,
that the principle was brought to this country by the earliest settlers as part of their
heritage of freedom, and that it has been recognized here as fundamental again and
again. Today it is found, in varying forms, not only in the Federal Constitution, but
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Several underlying policy considerations providejustification for the
Fifth Amendment protection against doublejeopardy. The principle
interest to be served is the need for finality of decisions." The
Supreme Court has stated:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system ofjurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.32
Implicit in the Court's statement is that by preserving finality, the
Double Jeopardy Clause will protect other principles that constitute
the foundation of our legal system, such as the belief that there is an
"inherent injustice in punishing a person twice for the same of-
fense,"3 the prevention of government oppression, 4 and the need
to protect an innocent defendant from wrongful conviction. 3 The
DoubleJeopardy Clause arguably encompasses additional protections,
including "preserving the integrity of ajury acquittal" 6 and "prevent-
ing judges from administering penalties not authorized by the
legislature."3
7
These underlying policies act as the setting for the analysis of
recent Supreme Court decisions expanding double jeopardy protec-
tion beyond criminal prosecution to preclude certain sanctions
imposed in civil proceedings. It is also with these policies in mind
in the jurisprudence or constitutions of every State, as well as most foreign nations.
Id. (citing Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)); see also
McAnich, supra note 26, at 414-18 (tracing history and policies of double jeopardy protection).
31. See Bryon L. Land, Increased Double Jeopardy Protection for the Criminal Defendant: Grady
v. Corbin, 27 WILIAMErE L REV. 913, 915 (1991) (stating that need for final verdict is
fundamental premise behind double jeopardy guarantee).
32. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
33. Rudstein, supra note 30, at 589.
34. See Land, supra note 31, at 916 (positing that principle of finality underlying double
jeopardy is appropriate because potential exists for government to abuse criminal process).
35. See Paul IL Robinson, Comment, Grady v. Corbin: Solidifying the Analysis of Double
Jeopardy, 17 NEV ENG.J. ON CraM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 395, 407 (1991) (stating that repeated
attempts at conviction result in likelihood that innocent party will be adjudicated guilty).
"Forcing a defendant to 'run the gauntlet' a second time allows the government, with its
superior resources, to possibly 'wear down a defendant.' While the defendant is being both
economically and psychologically worn down, the government is improving and honing its trial
strategy each successive conviction attempt." Id. (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 408.
37. Id.; see also Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 175 (1874) (stating that when court
has imposed fine and imprisonment, where statute only conferred power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, it has punished defendant twice for one offense).
1160
1996] ADMINISTRATIVE DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION
that one must analyze the more specific issue of double jeopardy and
administrative driver's license suspensions.
B. Double Jeopardy and Civil Proceedings
Defense attorneys rely on a trilogy of cases decided by the Supreme
Court to argue that license suspensions violate the protection
guaranteed in the Double Jeopardy Clause. In 1989, the Court
decided United States v. Halper'8 and ruled for the first time that a
civil penalty could be considered punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.39 Since Halper, the Court has decided two other cases,
Austin v. United Statese and Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch.41
In these cases, the Court has held that civil forfeiture proceedings and
a civil drug tax violate double jeopardy when imposed along with
criminal prosecution for the same offense.4' To accurately analyze
whether license suspensions along with criminal prosecutions
constitute multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of
the Fifth Amendment, it is important to closely examine the prece-
dent set by these three cases.
1. United States v. Halper
In United States v. Halper, the Supreme Court considered whether a
civil penalty may constitute punishment under a double jeopardy
analysis.43 Under the particular facts of the case, the Court conclud-
ed that a "civil penalty authorized ... may be so extreme and so
divorced from the Government's damages and expenses as to
constitute [a] punishment," thereby violating double jeopardy when
it is imposed along with a criminal sanction.'
The respondent in Halper was the manager of a company that
provided medical service for patients eligible for Medicare.' Halper
submitted inflated claims for reimbursement to an insurance company
that served as a fiscal intermediary for Medicare.46 Because of this
misrepresentation, the insurance company overpaid the medical
38. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
39. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989).
40. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
41. 114S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
42. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) (characterizing
Montana drug tax as punishment for double jeopardy purposes); Austin v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993) (holding that Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment applies to
civil forfeiture of property).
43. Halper, 490 U.S. at 436.
44. Id. at 442.
45. Id. at 437.
46. I.
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service company, resulting in a total loss to the Government of
$585. 4" Halper was convicted on sixty-five counts of violating the
criminal statute prohibiting false claims, as well as on sixteen counts
of mail fraud.4 s As a result, he was sentenced to imprisonment for
two years and fined $5,000.4" Subsequently, the Government filed
suit under the civil False Claims Act, seeking to recover the statutorily
authorized penalty of $130,000 ($2000 for each of Halper's sixty-five
false claims).5 ' The district court refused to impose the $130,000
penalty, stating that it bore no "rational relation" to the Government's
$585 actual loss or the cost of litigating and investigating the
respondent's false claims." Because the civil penalty was so far
removed from the remedial goal of compensating the Government,
the district court held that it constituted punishment.5 2 The civil
penalty, therefore, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection
against multiple punishments for the same offense.53
The Supreme Court, on direct appeal from the district court,
agreed. 4 In a unanimous decision, the Court concluded for the first
time that the DoubleJeopardy Clause forbids the imposition of a civil
penalty on an individual who has already been punished for the same
conduct in a criminal prosecution to the extent that the civil sanction
is punitive, and not remedial, in character.55
The Court's decision in Halper established the test for courts to
follow when deciding cases involving parallel criminal and civil
sanctions: if the civil sanction is punitive in nature, it violates the
DoubleJeopardy Clause's protection against multiple punishments for
the same offense.56 In reaching its decision, the Court in Halper
took steps to elaborate this test and set forth criteria for determining
whether a sanction should be characterized as remedial or punitive. 7
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id at 438.
51. United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated and remanded,
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
52. Id. at 533-34.
53. Id.
54. Halper, 490 U.S. at 452. The Court remanded the case to the district court, however,
in order to allow the Government to contest the lower court's assessment of its losses. Id.
55. Id. at 447-49.
56. Id. at 448-49.
57. See id. at 449-50 (describing punishment as "overwhelmingly disproportionate" sanctions
or subsequent proceedings that bear no rational relationship to goal of compensating
Government).
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Prior to Halper, courts recognized a bright line distinction between
"criminal" and "civil" penalties, '8 and consequently, courts focused
heavily on the labels that Congress attached to particular sanctions.59
In Halper, the Government argued that the doublejeopardy guarantee
protects only against a second criminal penalty.6' Relying on three
61 teGvrprevious Supreme Court cases, the Government further argued that
criminal penalties are only imposed in criminal proceedings, while
proceedings authorized by civil statutes are necessarily civil in
nature.62 The Court rejected this argument, expressing its view that
while recourse to statutory language is usually appropriate in
determining the inherent nature of a proceeding, this inquiry was ill-
suited to the analysis of a sanction under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.63 The Court reasoned that because the double jeopardy
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense is
"intrinsically personal,"' violation of this protection can be deter-
mined only by examining the nature of the actual sanction, not the
nature of the proceeding authorizing the sanction.65 Simply put, a
court must look at the purposes actually served by the sanction, not
at the label affixed to it.66  In the Court's view, a sanction that is
applied in an individual case to serve the traditional goals of
58. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 1994)
(noting that courts once accorded great deference to whether sanctions were labeled "criminal"
or "civil"), cert. granted sub noa. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996); United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354,366 (1984) (concluding that forfeiture proceeding
is "civil" proceeding to which Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply); One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (stating that forfeiture of goods and payment
of monetary penalties, in spite of their severity, have been upheld as "civil" sanctions and not
subject to double jeopardy despite contention that they are essentially "criminal" in nature).
59. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1218. The Ninth Circuit stated: "If Congress
indicated a preference that the proceeding be denominated 'civil' rather than 'criminal,' the
Court would defer to that preference except in extraordinary circumstances." Id. (citing United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
60. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441.
61. l (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); United States ex reL Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956)); see Rex
Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at 151-52 (adhering strictly to legislative intent that remedies be "civil" to
hold that there was no doublejeopardy violation); Hess, 317 U.S. at 551-52 (referring to statutory
language to hold that civil penalty was remedial in nature); Helvefing, 303 U.S. at 402 (holding
that because Congress intended that statute impose "civil" penalty, tax must be considered
remedial, thus not invoking double jeopardy).
62. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441.
63. Id. at 447. The Court found that prior precedent did not "foreclose the possibility that
in a particular case a civil penalty... may be so extreme ... as to constitute punishment." Id.
at 441-42.
64. Id at 447.
65. I& at 447 & n.7.
66. Ii at 447-48. "In making th[e] assessment [of whether a sanction constitutes
punishment], the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance .... The notion
of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the
criminal law." Id.
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punishment, retribution, and deterrence, must be characterized as
punishment and will invoke double jeopardy protection.67
The Court enunciated the test for determining whether a civil
sanction constitutes a punishment for purposes of double jeopardy:
"[A] defendant who already has been punished in a criminal
prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to
the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution, "' The Court
emphasized that cases in which a civil sanction constitutes punishment
will not arise often.6" The Court also took deliberate steps to limit
this holding to cases in which the civil penalty is so excessive in
relation to a remedial goal that it crosses the line between remedy
and punishment.7"
The Court in Halper explicitly stated that its decision would not
preclude the Government from seeking and obtaining both the full
civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal
penalties if it chooses to do so in the same proceeding.7' In such
instances, double jeopardy is not at issue. Instead, the relevant
inquiry is whether the total punishment exceeds that authorized by
the legislature.73
After the Supreme Court's decision in Halper established the test for
determining whether a civil sanction constitutes punishment for
double jeopardy purposes, the Court decided two related cases that
defendants also use to support double jeopardy arguments in license
suspension cases.
2. Austin v. United States
Four years later in Austin v. United States, the Court revisited the
issue of whether a sanction imposed in a civil proceeding could be
considered punishment-this time for analysis under the Excessive
67. Id. at 448.
68. Id. at 44849.
69. Id at 449 (noting that it is "rare case" where sanctions will be overwhelmingly
disproportionate to damage caused).
70. Id. The Court stated:
We cast no shadow on these time-honored judgments. What we announce now is a
rule for the rare case, the case such as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty
provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages he has caused.
Id
71. Id at 450.
72. Id.
73. Id- (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983)).
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Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 74 rather than the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 75 Although Austin arose under the Excessive Fines
Clause, it employed the Halper criteria.76 It is arguable, therefore,
that a sanction that constitutes punishment for excessive fines
purposes will also constitute punishment under the Fifth Amend-
ment's Double Jeopardy Clause.
77
After the defendant in Austin pleaded guilty to one count of
possessing cocaine,71 the Government filed an in rein action against
his mobile home and auto body shop under the federal forfeiture
statute. 79 The Court held that this type of forfeiture was punitive in
nature ° and was therefore subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.81
In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that in rem
forfeitures have historically been understood as punishment.82 The
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
75. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993).
76. Id. at 2812. The Court in Austin stated that a "civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term." Id.
(citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
77. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding that "if a forfeiture constitutes punishment under the Halper criteria, it constitutes
'punishment' for purposes of both [the Excessive Fines Clause and the Double Jeopardy
Clause]"), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996); United States v.
McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299,1302 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that although Austinarose under
Excessive Fines Clause, its holding"compels the conclusion" that forfeiture of real property used
in connection with drug offense "is also a punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause").
The Ninth Circuit announced in $405,089.23 U.S. Currency.
To make it clear, we hold only that because the method of determining whether the
forfeiture constitutes punishment is identical, the answer to the question whether a
particular forfeiture constitutes punishment will always be the same for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause and the Eighth Amendment.
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1219 n.8.
78. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
79. IM.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a) (4), (a) (7) (1994). These sections provide:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate to the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled substances, their raw materials and
equipment used in their manufacture and distribution] ....
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land ... which is used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.
Id.
80. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
81. Id.
82. IM at 2810.
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Court examined statutes in existence during the period in which the
Eighth Amendment was framed, and found that forfeiture was listed
alongside other provisions for punishment."3 The Court further
determined that the word "forfeit" was often used in place of the
word "fine," which has historically been defined as a punitive
measure.84 The Court also cited several of its prior cases that held
that statutory in rem forfeiture constituted punishment 5
Next, the Court carefully examined the language and legislative
history of the statutory provisions and found them to confirm the
historical understanding of forfeiture as punitive in nature.8" It
maintained that the statute's "innocent owner" defense 7 serves to
condition forfeiture on the culpability of the owner of the goods
seized,'u and reveals a legislative intent to punish only those commit-
ting drug offenses.8 9  Additionally, the Court recognized that
Congress, in adding subsection (a) (7) to § 881 of the federal
forfeiture statute, described the forfeiture of property as "a powerful
deterrent" needed in addition to criminal sanctions such as fine and
imprisonment that do not provide sufficient deterrence or punish-
ment to combat the drug trade. °
Finally, the Court rejected the Government's argument that
forfeitures under these statutory provisions were remedial because (1)
"they remove the 'instruments' of the drug trade 'thereby protecting
the community from the threat of continued drug dealing;"'' and
(2) "the forfeited assets serve to compensate the Government for the
83. IdM at 2806-08.
84. Id. at 2807-08. The Court noted that the Act ofJuly 31, 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 39, which
states that an individual "shall forfeit and pay the sum of four hundred dollars for every
offence," substituted "forfeit" for "fine." Id. at 2807. The Court also cited several dictionaries
from the 1700s, all of which defined a forfeiture as a fine or vice versa. Id. at 2808 n.7.
85. Id. at 2808-10 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686
(1974) (finding that forfeiture statute furthers punitive and deterrent purposes)); Goldsmith-
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,510 (1921) (associating forfeiture with punishment for
guilty act); Dobbins Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1878) (linking forfeiture to
unlawful or wanton conduct); Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 364 (1808) (describing
forfeiture of goods as punishment)).
86. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810.
87. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a) (4) (C), (a) (7) (1994) (detailing "innocent owner" defense to
federal forfeiture statute). Section 881(a) (4) (C) provides that "no conveyance shall be forfeited
under this paragraph to the extent of an interest of any owner, by reason of any act or omission
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent,
or willful blindness of the owner." Id. Similarly, § 881 (a) (7) states that "no property shall be
forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge
or consent of that owner." Id
88. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Government's argument from Brief for United States, at 32).
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expense of law enforcement activity and for its expenditure on
societal problems such as urban blight, drug addiction, and other
health concerns resulting from the drug trade."92 The Court ac-
knowledged that in a prior case, forfeiture of the contraband itself has
been considered remedial because it prevents the public from being
exposed to dangerous or illegal items.93 It failed to find, however,
that this holding applied to vehicles used to transport illegal substanc-
es and real property used to facilitate the trafficking of drugs.94 The
Court refused to categorize these items as "instruments" of the drug
trade because there is nothing inherently criminal in possessing these
items by themselves.9
The Court also rejected the Government's characterization of
forfeiture as remedial, stating that substantial variations in the value
of goods seizable under the statute negate the possibility that
forfeiture is merely intended to compensate society or the govern-
ment for any damages sustained.96 Forfeiture, therefore, serves no
remedial purpose, and must be considered punishment that will
invoke the protections of the Eighth Amendment.97
The Court in Austin concluded by referring to the dicta in Halper
rather than its holding." The Court in Austin stated that even if
forfeiture under the relevant statutory provisions serves some remedial
purpose, it still must be considered punishment subject to the
limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. The Court reached this
conclusion because, as evident from the historical understanding of
forfeiture as punishment and the focus of the forfeiture statute on the
culpability of the owner, it also serves to deter and to punish.99
The Austin decision is significant to the administrative license
suspension issue because it emphasizes that a sanction's underlying
purpose, evident from the sanction's history and the legislative intent
behind the statute authorizing the sanction, is crucial to its character-
ization as punitive or remedial. Lower courts often cite the last
statement of the Austin opinion, despite its misinterpretation of the
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984)).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965), which
held that there is nothing criminal in possessing automobile used to transport illegal liquor).
96. Id at 2812 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)).
97. Id
98. Id. The Court in Austin stated: "'[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment .... '" Id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
448 (1989)).
99. Id.
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Halper holding, to argue that a civil sanction must be "solely" remedial
to avoid invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause." °
3. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch
The Court's most recent pronouncement on double jeopardy,
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 10 however, makes no mention
of the solely remedial requirement. It instead cites, as the existing
rule, Halpefs holding, which requires only that a sanction "fairly be
characterized as remedial" to avoid invoking the double jeopardy
guarantee.' °2 In Kurth Ranch, six members of an extended family
were convicted in a criminal proceeding of cultivating and selling
marijuana. 1°3 The court sentenced two of the respondents to prison
and conferred suspended sentences on the others.'04 The county
attorney also instituted civil forfeiture proceedings, obtaining
$18,016.83 in cash, along with equipment used in the drug opera-
tion."°5 In addition, the petitioner revenue department attempted
to collect from the respondents a tax on the possession of marijuana
pursuant to Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act.' According to
the state's calculations, the respondents' tax liability totaled almost
$900,000.107
The Dangerous Drug Tax Act provides that the revenue collected
should be allocated to "'youth evaluation' and 'chemical abuse'
programs and to 'enforce the drug laws."'10' 8 After conflicting
100. See, eg., State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744,748 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (detailing defendant's
argument that because license suspension has deterrent purpose and effect in addition to
remedial purpose, it must be characterized as punishment); State v. Hickham, No. MV 94-
618025, 1995 WL 243352, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 1995) (stating that Austin decision
made it clear that double jeopardy question rests on whether statute is solely remedial), rev'd,
235 Conn. 614 (1995); State v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 538-39 (Ohio Mun. 1995) (citing
Austin and using solely remedial requirement to hold that Administrative License Suspension
is punishment and violates double jeopardy); see also Taylor, supra note 13, at 82 (arguing that
Court reaffirmed solely remedial standard in Austin).
101. 114 S. CL 1937 (1994).
102. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994).
103. Id. at 1942.
104. Id.
105. Id
106. Id.; see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to 123 (1987) (repealed 1995) (setting forth
Dangerous Drug Tax Act).
107. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. CL at 1941. Montana law entitled the petitioner to assess the tax
at a rate of 10% of the market value of the drugs, or $100 per ounce of marijuana and $250 per
ounce of hashish, whichever was greater. Id
108. Id (citingMONT. CODEANN. §§ 15-25-121, 15-25-122 (1987) (repealed 1995)). In Kurth
Ranch, the Court stated:
According to the Act's preamble, the Montana Legislature recognizes that the use of
dangerous drugs is not acceptable, but concludes that because the manufacturing and
sale of such drugs has an economic impact on the State, "it is appropriate that some
of the revenue generated by this tax be devoted to continuing investigative efforts
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rulings from lower federal courts and the Montana Supreme Court,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the tax
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 9
In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court first rejected the
lower federal courts' use of Halper to answer the issue posed in Kurth
Ranch."I° The Court reasoned that tax statutes are enacted to serve
the nonpunitive purpose of raising revenue, a purpose that is quite
different from the "punitive" purposes typically served by civil
penalties, such as the one at issue in Halper."' Because of this
different remedial goal, the Court refused to employ Halpers method
of balancing the penalty assessed with the costs incurred by the
government in order to determine whether the sanction was remedial
or punitive.12 The Court recognized that even though taxes are
usually intended to serve a legitimate remedial purpose, at some
point, they can become punitive in character.1 3 The Court then set
out to determine whether the specific tax at issue in Kurth Ranch
crossed the line between remedy and punishment."'
The Court began its analysis by admitting that the statute's tax
assessment was extraordinarily high, revealing the legislature's
directed toward the identification, arrest, and prosecution of individuals involved in
conducting illegal continuing criminal enterprises that affect the distribution of
dangerous drugs in Montana."
Id. at 1941 n.4 (quoting 1987 MONT. LAWS 563).
109. Id. at 1944. The Kurth family filed for bankruptcy shortly after the tax was assessed.
Id. at 1943. The Bankruptcy Court decided that the proper tax amount was only $181,000, but
stated that even this lower tax assessment violated doublejeopardy. Id. Relying on Halper, the
Bankruptcy Court rejected the Government's argument that the tax was remedial because the
legislature intended it to recover law enforcement costs, stating that the Department of Revenue
"failed to introduce one scintilla of evidence as to cost of the above government programs or
costs of law enforcement to combat illegal drug activity." Id. (citing Kurth Ranch v. Department
of Revenue, 145 B.R. 61, 74 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990)). The Bankruptcy Court noted that the tax
assessed was equal to eight times the product's market value, evidence that it was punitive in
nature. Id. at 1943 n.12. The District Court and the Court of Appeals both affirmed the ruling
of the Bankruptcy Court, relying on Halperand finding that the tax constituted an impermissible
second punishment for the same criminal conduct. Id. at 194344 (citing In reKurth Ranch, 986
F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1993), affg No. CV-90-084-PGH, 1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont. Apr. 23,
1991) (holding that drug tax punishes defendants second time for same offense violating double
jeopardy)). While this case was pending on appeal, the Montana Supreme Court decided a
related case, in which it concluded that the Dangerous Drug Tax Act did not violate double
jeopardy because it had a legitimate remedial purpose and was not excessive. Id. (citing
Sorensen v. State Dep't of Revenue, P.2d 29, 33 (Mont. 1992)).
110. Id at 1944. "In Halperwe considered whether and under what circumstances a civil
penalty may constitute 'punishment' for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. Our answer
to that question does not decide the different question whether Montana's tax should be
characterized as punishment." Id (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 436 (1989)).
111. Id. at 1946.
112. IdHat 1948.
113. Id. at 1946.
114. Id. at 194647.
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intention to deter people from possessing marijuana." 5 The Court
stated, however, that a tax cannot automatically be characterized as
punitive simply because of its high rate or obvious deterrent pur-
pose." 6 Still, the Court found that these two characteristics, along
with several additional features of the Montana statute, distinguished
it from most tax assessments and indicated that it was punitive in
character."7 The Court noted these features, stating that the statute
authorizes the tax only when a crime is committed,18 and that the
tax is exacted only after the taxpayer has been arrested for this
criminal conduct." 9 Furthermore, the Court asserted that despite the
legislature's characterization of the Act as a property tax, it exacts
payment on an item that the government has already taken from the
taxpayer's possession. 20
The Court also differentiated between taxes on illegal activities and
those assessed on legal, but disfavored activities, for the purpose of
deterring the activity and simultaneously raising revenue.'2 ' The
Court stated:
[B]y imposing cigarette taxes... a government wants to discourage
smoking. But because the product's benefits [i.e., employment,
revenue] are regarded as outweighing the harm, that government
will allow the manufacture, sale, and use of cigarettes as long as the
manufacturers, sellers, and smokers pay high taxes . ... These
justifications vanish when the taxed activity is completely forbidden,
for the legitimate revenue-raising purpose that might support such
a tax could be equally well served by increasing the fine imposed
upon conviction. 122
The Court concluded that, because of these distinguishing features,
the tax in question departed so far from normal revenue laws as to
become a form of punishment under double jeopardy analysis.123
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1946. Showing support for this assertion, the Court recognized that exactions on
other items, such as alcohol and cigarettes, have an obvious deterrent purpose and may be quite
steep, yet these taxes are presumed valid. Id.
117. Id.
118. 1d. at 1947.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1948. The Court characterized this tax as unmistakably punitive in character,
because unlike normal taxes to raise revenue, it is imposed on criminals and no others. Id.
121. Id. at 1947.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1948. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited a long history of court rulings
that held that drug taxes, in general, have a punitive and deterrent character. Id. at 1948 n.24
(citing United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45-46 (1950); Rehg v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue,
605 N.E.2d 525, 531 (I1. 1992); State v. Gallup, 500 N.W.2d 437, 445 (Iowa 1993); State v.
Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688, 691 (S.D. 1986); and Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 13 (Utah
1992)).
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As a result, it affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and held
the tax unconstitutional as applied to the defendants.
124
Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch set forth the precedent against
which double jeopardy challenges of administrative license suspen-
sions must be examined. These decisions are crucial because they
articulate the test for determining whether civil sanctions imposed
along with criminal sanctions, in a separate proceeding for the same
offense, constitute punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. An examination of the ALS issue under this test must result
in the conclusion that license suspensions are not punishment
because they are remedial in both purpose and effect.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND ALS
In ALS cases, defendants argue that administrative license suspen-
sions imposed along with criminal sanctions invoke the Fifth
Amendment's protection against "multiple punishments for the same
offense," as do other sanctions imposed in parallel civil and criminal
proceedings. 1" Although the question of punishment is the crucial
issue, proponents of ALS have attempted, with little success, to
persuade courts to dismiss constitutional challenges to license
suspensions based on an alternative argument. The crux of this
alternative argument is that these sanctions are imposed as part of the
same proceeding,1 26 which is permissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.1 27 Even if this arguments fails, however, license suspensions
do not invoke double jeopardy protection because they cannot be
characterized as punishment.2 '
124. Id. at 1949.
125. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
126. See State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376, 1382 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that although
criminal and civil sanctions at issue may occasionally demand separate hearings, both are
imposed in same proceeding and do not invoke doublejeopardy). By contrast, the vast majority
of courts either address this issue without much analysis, and simply concede that the sanctions
involved are imposed in separate proceedings, or fail to address it at all. See, e.g., Davidson v.
MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Sims, No. CA94-12, 1995 WL
493291, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1995); State v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA. 232, 1995 WL
387619, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App.June 27, 1995).
127. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 450. "Nor does th[is] decision prevent the Government from
seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized
criminal penalties in the same proceeding." Id While in certain circumstances multiple
punishments are permissible, they are barred if imposed in separate proceedings. SeeMissouri
v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983).
128. Prosecutors sometimes also argue in the alternative that license suspension and
subsequent prosecution are not sanctioning the same offense. Two sanctions for separate
offenses, they contend, are permissible under the DoubleJeopardy Clause regardless of whether
both sanctions constitute punishment. See Jesselyn McCurdy, Talking Points: Double Jeopar-
dy/AdministrativeLicenseRevocation, PROSECUTOR,June 1995, at 21,23 (arguing that criminal DUI
and license suspensions are not imposed for same offense because elements that state must
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A. ALS and DUI as Separate Proceedings
Recent decisions by the Second 129 and Eleventh' Circuits have
considered whether parallel criminal and civil sanctions should be
imposed in the same or separate proceedings. In these cases, both
courts held that because the forfeiture actions and criminal prosecu-
tions involved took place at approximately the same time and involved
the same criminal violations, they were part of a "single, coordinated
prosecution"13' and did not invoke double jeopardy protection.12
The Ninth Circuit, however, in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, rejected this rationale as contradictory to both common
sense and Supreme Court precedent) 3 The Court noted that the
civil forfeiture action and the criminal prosecution were instituted and
tried at different times before different fact finders, presided over by
different judges, and resolved by separate judgments.'34  Based on
these factors, it held that these two actions constituted separate
proceedings.135 According to the Ninth Circuit, a forfeiture case
could not be considered the same proceeding as a criminal prosecu-
tion unless the two were brought in the same indictment at the same
time.13 6
prove to impose them are different).
In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Supreme Court stated, "The
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 304
(citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)). This inquiry is one in which close
examination of statutory provisions is critical. Because license suspensions exist in 38 states,
each constructing the relevant provisions differently, the inquiry is beyond the scope of this
Comment. See supra note 9 (listing state statutory provisions mandating ALS). Most ALS
decisions, in fact, have failed to address the issue, simply assuming that sanctions are imposed
for the same offense and focusing on the issue of punishment. See, ag., State v. Schwander, No.
IN94-08-1350, 1995 WL 413248, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct.June 15, 1995) (finding that facts did not
support determination that severity of tax constituted punishment for double jeopardy
purposes); State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (determining that
license revocation is not punishment for purposes of double jeopardy); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d
510, 514 (Vt. 1992) (holding that license suspension is not criminal punishment invoking
protection from double jeopardy).
129. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bottone v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 922 (1993).
130. United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994).
131. Id. at 1499; Millan, 2 F.3d at 21.
132. One Single Family Reiden4 13 F.3d at 1499; Milian, 2 F.3d at 21.
133. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1216-17. Attacking the claimants on two separate fronts gives the Government a
significant advantage. Id. at 1217. If the defendant is convicted on criminal charges, then the
Government can obtain summary judgment as to the civil forfeiture, but even if the defendant
is acquitted, the Government still may be able to seek forfeiture because of the more lenient
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License suspensions are, arguably, part of a "single, coordinated
prosecution"" imposed in the same proceeding as criminal DUI
sanctions."t Both the license suspension and DUI sanction result
from a single arrest 39  The requisite forms for each are filed
together and are reviewed together at the defendant's initial appear-
ance, and both matters are docketed together for consideration at a
pretrial conference."4 These factors have led at least one court to
rule that these sanctions are in fact imposed as part of the same
proceeding and do not invoke double jeopardy. 4'
Other factors in license suspension cases, however, lead to the
concession that these sanctions are, in fact, imposed in two separate
proceedings. For example, an administrative license suspension
instituted for violation of Maryland's statute, 42 is made without
determination of whether an individual has violated criminal
statutes. While an appeal procedure is allowed, that procedure
can only be classified as an administrative action independent of the
criminal action for the following reasons: (1) the appeal is heard
separately of the criminal charges; (2) the burden of proof is placed
upon the licensee rather than upon the state; and (3) otherwise
impermissible evidence which would be excluded in a criminal
proceeding becomes prima facie evidence against the individual
under suspension."4 As the majority of courts have concluded,"4t
and as one has expressly stated, the timing and manner of the
administrative procedure demonstrate that it is designed to be
standards in civil matters. Id. The Ninth Circuit expressed concern that this strategy used by
prosecutors will provide the government, with its superior resources, a greater opportunity to
force an individual to defend himself against the same charges more than once. Id. Based on
this concern, the court believed that a double jeopardy violation existed in this case and was
unwilling to mask the reality of the violation by labeling the two proceedings a "single
coordinated prosecution." Id.
137. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bottone v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1993).
138. See State v. Baker, 650 N.E.2d 1376, 1383 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995) (describing how single
arrest triggers both sanctions); State v. Uncapher, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d 4, 16 (Mun. Ct. 1995)
(discussing how current version of statute has immediate suspension of license at time of DUI,
constituting one proceeding).
139. Baker, 650 N.E.2d at 1383.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Marzolf v. Superior Court, No. 1 CA-SA 95-0245, 1995 WL 686671, at * 1 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1995); Davidson v. Macinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
People v. Devorak, 658 N.E. 2d. 869, 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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separate from the criminal prosecution. 46  Accordingly, "[e]ven
though some courts may adjudicate the civil administrative and
criminal issues in a single courtroom proceeding, 'the law clearly
characterizes the two proceedings as separate and independent. ' 1 47
B. ALS: Punishment or Remedy
The test established in Halper for determining whether a civil
penalty constitutes punishment, requires an assessment of the
character of and purposes served by the sanction, rather than of the
nature of the proceedings.14 ' Defendants in DUI cases rely on the
language in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch to argue that ALS
provisions constitute punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause because they serve retributive and deterrent functions and are
not of the remedial nature envisioned by the Supreme Court when it
decided these cases.1 49  This argument, however, strictly relies on
the language of these cases, and does not consider the specific
context of the ALS argument. Defendants relying on this argument
are therefore making misplaced analogies to support their claims. A
close analysis by state courts of the ALS issue reveals that license
suspensions were not intended as and, consequently, do not operate
as "punishment." 50
1. ALS as remedial in purpose
Administrative license suspensions serve a goal quite different than
the civil sanctions in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch.5' Yet, such
146. State v. Sims, No. CA94-12, 1995 WL 493291, at *3 (Ohio Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1995)
(citing State v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA 232, 1995 WL 387619, at * 5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27,
1995); Ohio v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995)).
147. Id. (quoting Cleveland v. Miller, 646 N.E.2d 1213, 1215 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995)).
148. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446-52 (1989).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99 (discussing Court's reliance in Austin on dicta
from Halper and how statutory provisions served punitive function rather than remedial
function).
150. For cases holding that a license revocation does not constitute a punishment for double
jeopardy purposes, see State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); Baldwin v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 427 (Ct. App.June 23, 1995); Davidson v.
MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223,223-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Higa, No. 17737, 1995 WL
297073, at *5 (Haw. May 17, 1995); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Me. 1995); State v.
Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). See also Daniel T. Gilbert, Is Suspension
of Drivers' Licenses in Jeopardy?, PROSECUTOR, June 1995, at 24 (discussing how AILS is not
punishment); McCurdy, supra note 127, at 21 (detailing how AILS is remedial, not punitive).
151. SeeGilbert, supra note 150, at25 (arguing that license suspension's purpose is to protect
public safety). Many ALS cases state this explicitly. See, e.g., Butler v. Department of Safety &
Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790, 796 (La. 1992); Hanson, 532 N.W.2d at 601; State v. Sims, 1995 WL
493291, at *6 (Ohio Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1995); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510,513 (Vt. 1992).
Compare these cases with Halper, Kurth Ranch, and Austin, supra Part I.B (stating that alleged
purposes of penalty, tax, and forfeiture were, respectively, to compensate government for loss,
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suspensions still meet Halpe'?s requirement of being "fairly character-
ized as remedial."152 As a result, these ALSs do not invoke double
jeopardy protection."' Evidence to support this characterization
lies in (1) the purpose and intent of state legislatures in enacting ALS
statutes;154 (2) the fact that ALS statutes have been historically
viewed as remedial, because they revoke a privilege voluntarily granted
and not a constitutional right;'55 and (3) the fact that Halper does
not require that statutes be solely remedial. 56
a. Legislative intent behind ALS
In enacting ALS statutes, state legislatures intended to enhance
public safety by providing efficient means of removing potentially
dangerous drivers from the road. 57 Defendants note that the
Supreme Court in Halper worded the test distinguishing a remedial
sanction from a punitive sanction by asking whether the civil penalty
sought bears any "rational relation to the goal of compensating the
Government for its loss."' They argue that the government rarely
suffers monetary loss because of defendants' chemical test results, and
that, even when monetary loss is suffered, license suspension does not
adequately compensate for that loss.'59 Defendants claim that
license suspensions, therefore, cannot be considered remedial in
to raise revenue, and to reimburse government for costs spent investigating and combatting
crime).
152. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
153. Id
154. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text (analyzing legislative intent behind ALS).
155. See infra notes 170-79 and accompanying text (discussing historical views of ALS).
156. See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text (providing overview of Halpe's
requirements).
157. SeeDavidson v. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223,-225 (Fla. App. 1995) ("[T] he administrative
remedy of suspending a driver's license ... continues to be primarily for the purpose of
enhancing safe driving on public highways."); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995)
(maintaining that legislature intended suspension to provide public with safe roads); State v.
Cassady, 662 A.2d 955, 958 (N.H. 1995) (emphasizing that primary goal of ALS procedure is to
remove irresponsible drivers from state highways as quickly as possible to protect public); see also
Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199, 203 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (discussing legislative history of
ALS bill for drunk drivers). A report behind the bill proposing what has become MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 16-205.1, clearly indicates this purpose. The report states:
This bill would assure immediate and certain sanctions by the Administration. Speedy
[A]dministrative sanctions would help the offender to recognize the cause and effect
relationship between the offense and the sanction which would otherwise be weakened
by lengthy delays in the court processes. It takes drunk drivers off the roads and it
would save lives.... [Q] uickAdministrative Hearings could identify an individual who
may be a problem drinker and result in alcohol treatments sooner than the delays
caused by the court trial e.g. jury prayers, continuances.
158. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
159. See State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 748 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (detailing defendant's
argument against license revocation).
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accordance with the Halper criteria, and thus violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause when invoked with criminal prosecution. 60
By strictly adhering to the language in Halper, Austin, and Kurth
Ranch, defendants are interpreting the term "remedial" too narrowly.
As one court has stated, a "remedy" is any mechanism that corrects a
wrong; the term should not be limited to apply only to compensation
for monetary loss.1 61 By this definition, statutory provisions intend-
ing to remove a possibly dangerous driver from the highway serve a
remedial purpose-that of removing the evil of dangerous, intoxicat-
ed drivers-and courts have consistently recognized this characteriza-
tion as being accurate. 162 According to one court:
[t]he revocation of a driver's license is part of a civil/regulatory
scheme that serves a vastly different purpose from criminal punish-
ment. Our State's interest is to foster safety by temporarily
removing from public thoroughfares those licensees who have
exhibited dangerous behavior, which interest is grossly different
from the criminal penalties that are available in a driving while
under the influence prosecution. 6 '
While this purpose may "not [be] remedial in the sense meant by the
Halper decision,"" because it does not serve to compensate for
monetary loss, it is well within the broader definition of "remedy,"
and therefore license suspensions should not be considered "punish-
ment" under the double jeopardy analysis.1"
Moreover, the legislative intent of license suspensions is not focused
on the culpability of the DUI offender, unlike the forfeiture in Austin
or the marijuana tax in Kurth Ranch. License suspension statutes
include no provisions analogous to the "innocent owner defense" of
civil forfeiture statutes," and are not conditioned on the commis-
160. I&
161. Id. (citing WEBSTER's NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 1135 (3d College ed. 1988)); see also
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "remedial laws" as "those that [are]
designed to... introduce regulations conducive to the public good").
162. See, e.g., Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790, 795 (La.
1992) (stating that license suspension is remedial measure); State v. Fitzgerald, 622 A.2d 1245,
1248 (N.H. 1993) (holding that license suspension effected for purpose of removing
irresponsible drivers from highways is not criminal punishment, but is remedial in nature); State
v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (Vt. 1992) (holding that ALS has rational remedial purpose of
protecting public safety by removing drunk drivers from roads).
163. State v. Maze, 825 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Kan. Ct.App. 1992); see also Strong, 605A.2d at514
(declaring that summary suspension scheme serves rational remedial purpose of protecting
public safety by quickly removing potentially dangerous drivers from roadways).
164. Ellis v. Pierce, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95 (Ct. App. 1991).
165. I&
166. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89 (discussing significance of "innocent owner"
defense).
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sion of a crime.167 The fact that license suspensions are imposed on
those who refuse to take a chemical test, and not just on those who
fail and will probably be convicted of DUI, is indicative of the fact
that their purpose truly is the remedial one of removing possibly
dangerous drivers from the highway."
License suspensions can again be distinguished from the tax in
Kurth Ranch because, unlike the alleged revenue-raising purpose of
that tax, the purpose served by ALS cannot "be equally well served by
increasing the [length of suspension] imposed upon conviction."169
The purpose of ALS is to remove drivers from the highways quickly
while awaiting determination of pending criminal charges. °70  If
states had to wait until conviction to impose license suspensions, this
safety-oriented purpose would not be served and the danger to the
public would not be alleviated.
The legislative intent behind license suspensions supports the
assertion that they should be characterized as "remedial" for double
jeopardy purposes. Justification for this characterization is further
bolstered by the fact that suspensions have historically been viewed as
remedial.
b. History of ALS as remedial
Suspension of an individual's license to drive has not historically
been considered punishment because a license is a privilege granted
voluntarily and not a constitutional right conferred automatically. 7'
The revocation of such a privilege is a "traditional attribute of a
remedial sanction."7  Thus, any analogy comparing license suspen-
sions to forfeitures is misplaced. The forfeiture of property, imposed
167. See supra text accompanying notes 112-23 (discussing marijuana tax that is conditioned
on commission of crime).
168. See State v. Funke, 531 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995) ("This court has ... repeatedly
observed that the license suspension of habitual offenders is designed not to punish the
offender but to protect the public."); State v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Neb. 1995) (asserting
that "purpose of license revocation is to protect the public, and not to punish the licensee");
Strong, 605 A.2d at 514 (stating that "a 'bright line' has developed because the non-punitive
purpose of the license suspension is so clear and compelling").
169. Seesupra text accompanying note 121 (observing that increasing fine could equally serve
same purpose as revenue-raising tax).
170. See supra note 157 (discussing rationale behind AILS).
171. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (noting that constitutional restraints limit
state power to terminate rights and privileges);Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199, 205 (Md. 1993)
(maintaining that driving is not right but privilege); State v. Young 530 N.W. 2d 269, 278 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1995) (acknowledging that license is privilege, issued with understanding that state may
revoke it for cause); Strong, 605 A.2d at 513 (observing that while sanction arguably involves
affirmative restraint, it is revocation of voluntarily granted privilege (citing Helveringv. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391,399 (1938))); see also McCurdy, supra note 128, at 23 (asserting that driver's license
is privilege, not constitutional right).
172. State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 758 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
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as a penalty for crime, constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes. 3  A driver's license is not, however, a form of property.
Unlike property, a license cannot be purchased, sold, transferred, or
inherited, but rather is "a formal permission to do something;
especially authorization by law to do some specific thing."' 74
A driver's license stands as evidence of the government's authoriza-
tion to the individual to perform the activity of driving a motor
vehicle. As with many other activities, the government regulates the
right to drive subject to the condition that the licensee will perform
the activity competently and safely." In general, systems of govern-
ment regulation are based on the rationale that the public is exposed
to an unacceptable risk of harm if a licensee falls to act in a proper
manner. 6  Under these systems of regulation, the government has
the power to revoke a license to protect the public from this risk of
harm if a license-holder demonstrates that he or she is not fit to
continue the licensed activity.1 77 A better analogy exists in compar-
ing license suspensions to injunctions or restraining orders, which also
serve to prevent harm to the public and traditionally have been
considered remedial, than to forfeitures, which traditionally have been
viewed as punitive. 17
Furthermore, the system of licensing and regulating drivers is
analogous to the issuance and regulation of licenses to practice
professions, such as law or medicine. 79  In both instances, the
173. Id. at 748.
174. Id. at 752.
175. Id. at 753.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. If, however, defense attorneys persist in claiming that license suspensions are
analogous to forfeitures of property, they still cannot prevail on the issue of punishment. Some
types of forfeiture are not punitive. As the Court in Austin recognized, "forfeiture of contraband
itself may be characterized as remedial because it removes dangerous or illegal items from
society." Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2811 (1993) (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984)). License suspensions, if anything, are analogous to
forfeiture of contraband. Like the seizure of drugs, the suspension of a license removes a
dangerous instrumentality-a potentially hazardous driver-from a position in which he or she
can do harm to the public.
179. State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); see also Ellis v. Pierce, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 93, 94 (Ct. App. 1991).
The suspension of a driver's license after refusal to take a chemical test is closely
analogous to the disbarment or suspension of an attorney after a conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. The attorney's disbarment or suspension does not
constitute a second punishment in violation of the DoubleJeopardy Clause.. .. [T]he
purpose of disbarment or suspension is not to punish, but to protect the public from
unfit lawyers.
Id. at 95; see Gilbert, supra note 150, at 26 (arguing that states would be hampered in
prosecution or civil suspension of those who hold professional license if suspension of
administrative driver's licenses are found to violate double jeopardy); Rudstein, supra note 30,
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government can revoke a license if the licensee fails to adhere to
certain conditions and act responsibly. Courts have consistently
recognized that suspension of professional licenses, even if the
conduct leading to the suspension is potentially criminal, is remedial
because it is imposed to protect the public from unfit practitio-
ners.8 ° Because driver's licenses are so closely related to profession-
al licenses, in both purpose and method of regulation, they should
also be recognized by courts as remedial in nature and should be held
not to invoke double jeopardy protection.
c. ALS statutes not required to be "solely" remedial
It is evident from the legislative intent and the historical view of
license suspensions, that ALS statutes serve a remedial purpose.
Defendants in ALS cases argue, however, that this remedial purpose
is not enough to support the characterization of license suspensions
as remedial for double jeopardy purposes because they are also
intended to serve a deterrent purpose,18' one of the "goals of
punishment" under Halper.s2 The following language, crucial to
the Austin decision, lends support to this argument:
Retribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive govern-
mental objectives. From these premises, it follows that a civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment as we have come
to understand the term.18
3
at 612 (making same argument for constitutionality of professional licenses as for driver's
licenses).
180. See Emory v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 748 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984)
(maintaining that imposition of both criminal and civil sanctions does not violate double
jeopardy); Schillerstrom v. State, 885 P.2d 156, 158 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that revocation of
chiropractor's license did not violate double jeopardy when imposed after criminal conviction
for fraudulent behavior because it served remedial purpose of maintaining professional
standards of conduct for protection of public); Moserv. Richmond Bd. of Comm'rs, 428 S.E.2d
71, 72-73 (Ga. 1993) (upholding suspension of business license to operate spa after owner pled
guilty to sexual offense); Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 889 P.2d 705, 713 (Haw. 1995)
(holding that suspension of doctor's license was permissible under DoubleJeopardy Clause even
though doctor had already been convicted of criminal sex abuse and kidnapping); Kvitka v.
Board of Registration in Medicine, 551 N.E.2d 915,918 n.4 (Mass. 1990) (upholding revocation
of medical license after criminal conviction).
181. SeeState v. Hickham, No. MV 94-618025,1995 WL 243352, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. April
20, 1995) (discussing civil and criminal sanctions for license revocation), rev'd 235 Conn. 614
(1995); State v. Gustafson, No. 94 CA 232, 1995 WL 387619, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27,
1995) (finding that deterrent purpose of suspension barred criminal prosecution); State v.
Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 539 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995) (holding that double jeopardy barred
criminal prosecution of individual who tested in excess of Ohio's prohibited alcohol
concentration).
182. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
183. I&
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Although administrative license suspensions serve a deterrent
purpose, this purpose is secondary to the remedial purpose of
removing dangerous drivers from the roads." By requiring ALS
statutes to serve solely remedial purposes, Halper, Austin, and Kurth
Ranch have been interpreted too broadly.
It is important to emphasize that the language suggesting that a
sanction must be solely remedial to avoid characterization as
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, was not the explicit
holding in Halper.' It was, instead, dicta. The Court in Halper
stated:
[W]e therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a
defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution
may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent
that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.ss
The plain language of this holding merely requires that a remedial
goal, and not a deterrent or punitive one, be the primary purpose
underlying a civil sanction in order for it to escape characterization
as punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 7 Halper does not
require that this remedial purpose be the sole purpose.
Opponents of license suspensions have persistently used the solely
remedial argument, asserting that the Court in Austin adopted a new
test when it cited dicta in Halper, rather than the Halper holding.'8
This is simply not the case. The Kurth Ranch case, decided after
Austin, stated that Halper, not Austin, was the controlling prece-
dent.8 9 Because Kurth Ranch is the Court's most recent double
184. See Davidson v. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (announcing
that "the administrative remedy of suspending a driver's license because of drunk driving...
continues to be primarily for the purpose of enhancing safe driving on public highways"); State
v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995) ("[A]ny punitive or deterrent purpose served by the
suspension of an operator's driver's license... is merely incidental to the overriding purpose
intended by the Legislature to provide the public with safe roadways"); State v. Miller, 1995 WL
275770, at * 3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 1995) (noting that ALS "may have the incidental effect
of punishing the licensee and deterring other drivers from driving while intoxicated," but that
alone does not mean that AIS constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes).
185. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 449-50 (discussing whether sanction must be solely remedial to
avoid characterization as "punishment"); see also text accompanying notes 55-70 (detailing
reasoning behind Court's holding in Halper).
186. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (emphasis added).
187. Id.
188. Taylor, supra note 13, at 82 (arguing that after Austin, license suspensions must be
considered punishment for doublejeopardy purposes because they are designed in part to deter
and punish even though they also have remedial purpose).
189. See supra text accompanying note 101 (observing that Kurth Ranch does not mention
solely remedial requirement). Evidence that the Supreme Court did not interpret the Halper
holding to require that a sanction must be solely remedial lies in the fact that the Court began
its analysis of the tax in Kurth Ranch by stating, "[N]or [does] an obvious deterrent purpose
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jeopardy decision, it must be followed when analyzing the ALS
issue."' Kurth Ranch does not employ the solely remedial require-
ment,191 and therefore license suspensions must not be held to that
standard. Because license suspensions were created primarily to
protect the public, they must be characterized as having a remedial
purpose under double jeopardy analysis, even if they also serve some
incidental deterrent or punitive purpose.
2. ALS is not punitive in effect
The double jeopardy analysis of civil sanctions does not stop after
a remedial purpose is found. To prevent the invocation of the
DoubleJeopardy Clause, courts must find that these sanctions are not
so punitive in effect as to negate their remedial purpose.'92
In Halper, the Court found that the civil penalty at issue was so far
removed from serving its remedial purpose of reimbursing the
government that it crossed the line between remedy and punish-
ment. 95 The penalty sought equaled $130,000, whereas the actual
loss only amounted to $585.1' The Court explicitly limited its
holding to cases in which the punitive effect of a sanction is "over-
whelmingly-disproportionate" to the damage it is seeking to cor-
rect.1  The Court in Halper recognized that "for the defendant
even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.'' 96  A
automatically mark this tax a form of punishment." Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994). This statement implies that a remedial purpose can co-exist with
a punitive purpose and still result in the overall classification of a sanction as remedial.
190. See, e.g., United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 56 F.3d 41,43 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Rymek,J., dissenting) (arguing that when panel denied en banc hearing, it wrongly collapsed
Halper into Austin; and that Kurth Ranch handed down after denial needs to be considered),
denying reh'g to 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994); Baldwin v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 422,427-30 (Ct. App. 1995) (failing to mention Austin and using only Kurth Ranch and
Halper to hold that ALS does not violate Double Jeopardy Clause); State v. Savard, 659 A.2d
1265,1266 (Me. 1995) (employing Kurth Ranch standard in analysis of DoubleJeopardy Clause);
State v. Becker, 669 A.2d 548, 549 (Vt. 1995) (concluding that Kurth Ranch is controlling and
that it affirms Halper's holding which states that sanction is punishment only if there is no
remedial purpose behind it).
191. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1944 (analyzing case under Halper standard rather than
solely remedial requirement used in Austin).
192. Seesupranote 70 and accompanying text (observing that Courtin Halperlimited holding
to cases where civil penalty is excessive in relation to remedial goal).
193. United States v. Halper, 114 S. Ct. 435, 449 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes
52-53 (noting that in Halper, civil penalty was so far removed from remedial goal of compensat-
ing government that it violated Double Jeopardy Clause).
194. Halper, 490 U.S. at 439; see supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing district court's
refusal to impose $130,000 penalty in Halper).
195. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450; see supra note 70 and accompanying text (supporting
proposition that Court's decision limit's Halper analysis to case where civil penalty crosses line
between remedy and punishment).
196. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447. Halper implies that a mere "sting of punishment" felt by the
defendant is not determinative of sanction's characterization as "punishment" for double
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"sting," however, which occurs incidentally when a sanction is imposed
to serve a legitimate remedial goal, will not elevate the sanction to the
level of "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. 97
License suspensions are distinguishable from the penalty assessed
in Halper because they are not far removed from their remedial goal,
but rather are specifically tailored to address the goal of public
safety.19 Studies have shown that suspensions are an effective
means of protecting the public and improving the safety of high-
ways."9  Additionally, license suspensions are not excessive. Any
possible punitive effect felt by defendants-in the form of a deterrent
effect, inconvenience, or monetary ramifications for those who use
motor vehicles in their occupations-is mitigated by the fact that
license suspensions are temporary and that exceptions can be granted
for employment.2°
Applying Halpeis rationale, the incidental punitive effect of license
suspensions does not outweigh the valuable remedial goal that such
suspensions were enacted to serve. Because license suspensions serve
the purpose of protecting the public from the dangers posed by
drunk drivers, they cannot be characterized as punishment. As a
result, they do not subject defendants to "multiple punishments for
the same offense," and, thus, do not invoke the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to a pair of
forfeiture cases and plans to revisit the issue of double jeopardy in
parallel civil and criminal proceedings. The Court has recently heard
the Justice Department's appeal in the consolidated cases of United
States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency201 and United States v. Ursery20
and should clarify soon its stance on this issue so that the existing
confusion in the lower courts can be eliminated.
jeopardy purposes. Id.; seeState v. Nichols, 819 P.2d 995,998 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (maintaining
that statute which incidentally serves purpose of punishment does not violate DoubleJeopardy
Clause).
197. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
198. McCurdy, supra note 128, at 22-23.
199. See supra note 15 (providing statistics on effectiveness of ALS revocation law in deterring
drunk driving).
200. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (acknowledging that ALSs are temporary
and drivers may apply for restricted license for employment purposes).
201. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762
(1996).
202. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996).
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In resolving this issue, the Court should state explicitly that Halpeis
holding is the controlling test for determining whether a sanction can
be characterized as remedial or punitive for double jeopardy pur-
poses. This test requires only that a sanction be fairly characterized
as remedial to escape characterization as punishment; it does not
require, as does language in Austin, that a sanction be solely remedial.
Adopting the Halper test will limit the double jeopardy bar to rare
cases in which the civil sanction is excessive in relation to any
remedial goal. This solution is necessary to avoid drastic consequenc-
es. If the Court fails to rule this way, thousands of agency and
governmental regulations in existence, monitoring everything from
rules in the workplace, to clean air and water standards, to profession-
al conduct, will be unusable when the government chooses to seek
criminal prosecution. This result is extremely undesirable and is not
what the Court intended when deciding Halper and allowing a
punitive civil sanction to invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In the meantime, state courts, at all levels, need to acknowledge
that license suspensions serve a valid and tremendously important
remedial goal that outweighs any incidental punitive or deterrent
effect on defendants. These actions save lives and protect citizens
from the danger caused by drunk drivers. Courts must not focus their
analyses so narrowly as to find doublejeopardy violations simply when
remedial actions have some limited punitive effects. Doing so would
stretch recent Supreme Court holdings far beyond the scope to which
the Court intended they be applied.
Courts faced with double jeopardy challenges to ALS provisions
should uphold the provisions as constitutional and allow their use
along with criminal sanctions in the fight against drunk driving.
Anything less would conflict with the intent of state legislatures when
drafting the statutes, and the requirements set by the Supreme Court
in Halper.
Public policy also dictates this outcome. If license suspension
provisions are struck down in drunk driving cases, the government will
lose a highly effective method of protecting the public from danger-
ous drivers. Furthermore, courts likely would be inundated with
challenges to other administrative license suspensions, increasing the
possibility that other valuable mechanisms for protecting the public
will be lost.
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CONCLUSION
Careful analysis of the double jeopardy issue as applied to ALS
provisions compels the conclusion that administrative license
suspensions do not invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection
against "multiple punishments for the same offense." Support for this
conclusion rests on the fact that license suspensions are neither
punitive in purpose, nor in effect. They have been created by state
legislatures primarily to serve the remedial purpose of protecting the
public by removing dangerous drivers from the highways. The
underlying remedial purpose of ALS provisions allows them to escape
characterization as "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.
Courts must uphold these provisions as constitutional, and allow them
to be imposed along with criminal prosecution in drunk driving cases.
